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Like its predecessors, the UK Coalition government has promoted a new wave 
of localism in policy-making, democratic deliberation and the delivery of public 
services (Deas et al., 2012; Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). It introduced the 
Localism Act in 2012, and has also promoted an economic development 
agenda partly based on the idea of ‘rebalancing’ the UK’s London-centric 
economy through new local authority-private sector ‘Local Enterprise 
Partnerships’ (LEPs), city deals, and support for combined authorities (CAs) at 
city-region level (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013). The devolution debate has been 
given renewed impetus by the fall-out from the close (55-45%) Scottish 
Independence referendum in September 2014 which at the time of writing 
seems set to have far-reaching consequences for potential devolution of 
powers to local areas in England. Indeed, in November 2014 the Government 
announced that it plans to adopt a radical devolution programme to combined 
authorities starting with the election of a Mayor of Greater Manchester. This 
programme will grant powers that go beyond those granted to the Mayor of 
London and may include control over an integrated health and social care 
budget dependent on Greater Manchester making a convincing business case.  
 
This paper aims to demonstrate, through a brief overview of the Coalition 
government’s Localism policy agenda, and consideration of the Greater 
Manchester (GM) city region as a case study area, that localism has important 
implications for voluntary sector organisations (VSOs). In particular, we suggest 
that VSOs play a difficult and conflicted role in mediating the tensions and 
contradictions created by ‘Localist’ policies, and may be struggling to meet the 
expectations placed on them in the context of the Big Society and Localism 
agendas as well as the apparent retrenchment and withdrawal of the state from 
welfare provision. In particular, the case study discussion focuses on the 
implications for VSOs of Greater Manchester’s Public Sector Reform (PSR) 
programme, assuming, that, as is intended, devolution allows for the extension 
and development of this programme. 
 
 
A new ‘New Localism’? 
 
Following its formation in May 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition government, against the backdrop of the 2007/08 financial crisis, 
immediately set out an ‘austerity’ policy agenda based on deficit reduction 
through major spending cuts which would hit local government particularly hard. 
Two policy ideas developed during opposition – those of Localism and the ‘Big 
Society’ – were rapidly unrolled, both aiming in slightly different ways to devolve 
control of social policy, socio-economic development and civic renewal away 
from the state to a more local level – based on principles of localising power 
and funding, reducing ‘burdens’ and regulation, and encouraging diversity of 
provision and local innovation (Alcock, 2010; Stoker and Taylor-Gooby, 2011). 
The Localism Bill, introduced in 2010, represented a potentially radical moment 
for localism: “stripping away much of the regulatory infrastructure governing 
local authorities and creating a general power of competence for local 
government, strengthening community accountability through referendums and 
other devices, and empowering communities to take over state-run services” 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012, p 26).  
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As a number of commentators have suggested, the combination of spending 
cuts, a new and potentially radical localism and the clear rhetorical relaxation of 
central government attitudes to (potentially emergent) pluralism and spatial 
differentiation has the potential to allow (or even force) greater innovation and 
therefore greater differentiation in social policy characteristics and content 
between different places (see for example Deas et al., 2012). As Lowndes and 
Pratchett put it, the “Coalition’s ‘sink or swim’ approach to localism diverges 
significantly from that of New Labour… [which was] always hedged by the 
desire to retain control over significant public investments, and to maintain 
principles of standardisation and equity over and above those of diversity and 
local control.” (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012, p 37, emphasis added).  
 
However two aspects of the debate may have hindered a fuller interpretation of 
the consequences of the policy of Localism. Firstly, we note that – despite the 
admittedly variable and halting real progress towards localism in practice – 
much debate is still presaged on the normative assumption that the national 
(that is, English) scale is the primary scale for policy-making. If a new era of 
‘radical localism’ comes to pass it will be important to take seriously the 
development of locally tailored and designed social policy, albeit within the 
context of a still relatively centralised state and where there is complex multi-
level governance. In taking policy-creation and implementation at the GM level 
seriously in this paper, we begin to redress the balance. Secondly, we argue 
that the role, demands of, and requirements placed on the voluntary sector 
have tended to be downplayed or even ignored by researchers interested in 
issues of spatial governance on the one hand or Social Policy on the other. This 
is despite the fact that the voluntary sector plays a significant role in both 
developing, negotiating and dealing with the consequences of social policies 
developed at a variety of scales. We therefore aim to address this neglect by 
considering the impact of localism on the voluntary sector, while paying heed to 
the wider context in which the sustainability of the sector – given multiple 
resource constraints – is in doubt. 
 
Thus overall our broad concern is to address what the policy, practice and 
academic implications are if England becomes a container of diverse social 
policies applying to a range of spatial scales (e.g. city region, local authority, 
neighbourhood). We explore this by focussing on GM and in particular the 
implications for the local voluntary sector. We aim to show that GM is an 
exemplary case study: it demonstrates how an ambitious local public sector 
assemblage is attempting complex, large-scale policy implementation in the 
context of greater devolution to the city-regional scale. 
 
 
Public Service Reform in Greater Manchester  
 
The development of local social policy in GM 
 
Greater Manchester (GM) contains 2.68 million people and comprises the ten 
boroughs of Manchester, Rochdale, Oldham, Wigan, Salford, Stockport, 
Trafford, Tameside, Bury, and Bolton. Collectively they have maintained a 
semblance of metropolitan governance through the Association of Greater 
Manchester Authorities (AGMA) and more recently achieved, in 2011, the status 
of Combined Authority, joined by four others in 2014. The context of austerity 
has increased pressures on the 10 local authorities to seek economies of scale 
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by centralising functions and collaborating in commissioning public services. To 
some extent, and with much diminished resources, AGMA and its associated 
agencies have taken over the strategic role formerly done on a regional basis 
by North West Development Agency (abolished in 2011) and now negotiate 
directly with central government. 
 
Because GM has already received extensive coverage for its insistently 
entrepreneurial governance reforms (see Harding et al., 2010; Rees and Lord, 
2013), we focus here on the potentially radical and transformational approach to 
the delivery and management of welfare services. Crucially, GM has taken a 
single-minded and distinctive approach to what it sees as the mounting crisis in 
welfare services: massive increase in need at the same time as decreasing 
resources. The approach is spearheaded by New Economy, a sort of think-tank 
cum quasi-executive agency for Greater Manchester, alongside senior officers 
for the 10 LAs that make up AGMA together with other public sector agencies 
such as GM Police, the Crime Commissioner and the newly reformed local 
NHS. 
 
Greater Manchester is also one of the 4 areas of the UK selected to trial Whole 
Place Community Budgets alongside Essex, West Chester and ‘London Tri-
Borough’. Community Budgets is described as a partnership between these 
areas and national government in co-producing more efficient welfare services 
through pooling budgets between public authorities and using tools such as 
‘customer journey mapping’ and ‘cost-benefit analysis’. They are an explicit 
attempt to produce local solutions, but within an ideological framework set by 
national government. 
 
At its heart, GM’s proposed solution to dealing with diminishing resources is to 
increase the efficiency of welfare services, and to stem future demand. Part of 
its diagnosis is that there is a systemic problem in the way that services 
approach social problems. The benefits from an innovation in one part of the 
system should accrue to other parts of the system, but there is no effective 
feedback loop of innovation and each of the public authorities continue to plan 
and operate in isolation. Thus the remedy is to implement a joined-up approach 
to the needs analysis, planning and commissioning of new services for the 
area.  
 
So far there is little that departs from the script generated by a decade or so of 
academic, think tank and Government-sponsored research around public 
service system reform. Governmental initiatives have identified the need for a 
joined up approach not least the Total Place Initiative begun by New Labour, 
which aimed to identify and quantify the public funding streams going into an 
area and how they might be combined and used in ways that generated savings 
in the longer term. Other examples include Civil Service generated concepts 
such as ‘save to gain’, the early action/intervention philosophy underpinning the 
Allen Report and the subsequent Early Intervention Foundation (Allen, 2011), as 
well as the theory of change that underpins social impact bonds (SIBs).  
 
However, there are some important nuances and developments in the way that 
GM is pursuing public services and welfare reform. The approach is based on 
an economic model of efficiency with cost-benefit analysis (CBA) at its heart. 
The model was developed by New Economy economists and agreed with 12 
government departments. Initially, 4 ‘problem areas’ were initially identified as 
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the focus for Public Services Reform (PSR):  
 
1) Troubled Families: Reducing the cost to the public purse of a number of 
families that are high users of public services. 
2) Health and Social Care: Integrated working that increases resilience and 
promotes independence. 
3) Transforming Justice: Reducing levels of crime by focusing on services 
for priority and prolific offenders. 
4) Early Years: Increasing the number of children who arrive at school 
ready to learn. 
 
For each problem area a new delivery model (NDM) has been created based 
around a number of targeted and evidence-based interventions, which it is 
hoped will bring about ‘transformational change’ within a small number of years. 
The predicted savings arising from the interventions will be used to develop a 
business plan (investible proposition) to raise investment from central 
government to fund the transitional costs. As well as paying back the investment 
the business plan will enable welfare services (at least those within the aegis of 
the ‘family’ of Greater Manchester public bodies) to deliver better services with 
less money. 
 
PSR involves using money differently, investing in tried and tested ways 
of working, which deliver a return on investment, which in turn can then 
be re-used. (MCC, 2013, p 2) 
 
The most advanced of the PSR streams is Troubled Families due to central 
government investment (HM Government, 2014). The focus of the programme 
is a “defined cohort” of the “most troubled” individuals or families who are high 
cost to local public bodies. Each individual family who is referred to the 
programme is allocated a key worker who makes an assessment and offers a 
range of Tier 1 “interventions” (assertive outreach, parenting team, family 
intervention project, families first) which are carefully “sequenced” (delivered at 
the right time in the right order) and supported by a number of Tier 2 
interventions (In Manchester many of these are spot purchased from VSOs to 
make sure they are available at the point they are needed) – see Figure 1 for 
illustration of the model. 
 
Fundamental to the approach is the seamless referral to services, 
through improved sequencing and prioritisation of cases. (MCC, 2013, p 
4) 
 
Figure 1 here. 
 
The programme is evaluated by the use of randomised control trials, in which 
one area of GM operating ‘business as usual’ (BAU) services is compared to 
the NDM being operated in another location within GM. The Greater 
Manchester Troubled Families Impact and Evidence Toolkit (AGMA, 2014) is 
employed, again based on a CBA model, to demonstrate the financial “evidence 
of [financial] savings” accrued by the programme.  
 
This article does not aim to assess the Troubled Families Programme in GM, 
but to focus on the participation – or rather, barriers to – of VSOs as 
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stakeholders in reform and the implications of such potentially radical changes 
to the nature of welfare provision. 
 
The implications of PSR for the voluntary sector 
 
There are several problematic areas in the Troubled Families approach that 
militate against the involvement of VSOs and this article concentrates on three: 
the appearance of ‘central planning’ at a GM Level, the privileging of forms of 
evidence in the design and evaluation of policy success, and shortcomings in 
the theory of change underpinning the model. None of these are new problems 
in VSO involvement – either at the local level or more nationally – but they have 
been brought together in a specific way within the Troubled Families 
Programme such that it may have significant implications for the future 
involvement of VSOs in GM’s approach to PSR. 
 
i) ‘Central Planning’ at a GM Level 
 
The Troubled Families approach was developed at Greater Manchester level by 
the public sector, primarily local authorities, led by the PSR team based within 
New Economy. This small team, within a very short period, and with little public 
or VSO scrutiny and involvement designed a radically new approach to key 
problems using a technocratic, centralised planning model. As one would 
expect the language used in the planning is highly jargonised, specialist and 
difficult to understand for most VSOs. 
 
Few VSOs have networks of influence that extend beyond their local borough 
and those that do tend to be national bodies. There are only a small number of 
VSOs that are solely Greater Manchester focused. Local VSOs and 
infrastructure bodies, principally Councils for Voluntary Service (CVSs) have 
been slow to understand and react to the shift of power and decision-making to 
the GM level, and their capacity to react and influence has been exacerbated by 
spending cutbacks, as well as, arguably the longer-term weaknesses 
associated with voluntary sector infrastructure bodies. In the case of PSR the 
scale of the crisis facing public bodies was used by the PSR team to explain 
why there had been so little involvement or consultation, however this is in a 
context where democratic involvement at GM level from civic society 
organisations is still relatively under-developed.  
 
ii) Privileged forms of evidence 
 
The Tier 1 interventions within the Troubled Families Programme are chosen on 
the basis of an evidence hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy is randomised 
control trials carried out in the UK less than a year ago. This type of evidence is 
estimated to have a data error of 2 per cent, which feeds into the predicted 
fiscal impact (money saved to the state) using cost benefit analysis. At the 
bottom of the hierarchy is uncorroborated expert judgement more than 5 years 
old which is essentially useless as it has an estimated data error of 40 per cent. 
New Economy run a cost benefit analysis network and regular training sessions 
to enable both VSOs and statutory bodies to estimate the fiscal impact of their 
services. 
 
Leaving aside the contentious idea of an evidence hierarchy there is a central 
problem for VSOs in the theoretical construct of an ‘intervention’, a tightly 
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defined set of practices codified in a manual, backed up by a set of professional 
standards, which is transferable and reproducible. Many VSOs do not describe 
the work they do as interventions and find it difficult to parcel up their services in 
this way. They tend to constantly morph the work they do to fit the particular 
context of both the service and the individual they are helping, as well as trying 
to modify the external service environment for the benefit of the client. 
 
Secondly, even where the services that a VSO provides can be parcelled up 
into interventions, few if any VSOs have the resources, time or expertise to 
carry out randomised control trials. Where monitoring and evaluation is carried 
out it tends to be relatively unsophisticated and rely on user feedback, case 
studies and small numbers of clients. The standard being used is simply too 
difficult for VSOs to meet so all but the largest are unable to participate. The 
evidence that they do have which shows high levels of impact and success are 
dismissed as they do not rate highly in the evidence hierarchy. New “evidence-
based” interventions are preferred to existing working models. “What works” is 
restricted to “interventions” where there is “high quality” research evidence. 
 
iii) Theory of Change  
 
The theory of change underpinning the PSR model, as defined in the NDM for 
the Troubled Families Programme, in common with other pathway models, 
resembles an industrial process - this is not to suggest that key workers working 
in the programme treat their clients as if they were objects. It is a description of 
the theoretical model not the practice. A troubled family enters at one end as a 
set of needs, each of the needs is defined and separated and an appropriate 
intervention found to solve each need. The process is made more efficient 
through prioritisation, sequencing and focusing on those most in need. The 
‘troubled family’ is de-contextualised, in particular from communities of 
geography and identity. The model could apply anywhere with any community, 
it is not a locally based solution. 
 
It is difficult to see how local VSOs who work within a particular geographical 
community or with a particular community of interest fit within the model, instead 
they are viewed in an instrumental manner as external points of referral. Their 
models of work, based often on a deep and rich understanding of the 
environment and identity of a troubled family or individual, and on a recognition 
of the structural and systemic inequalities that they face, is at odds with the 
decontextualized, problem-based, ‘industrial’ process model of the Troubled 
Families Programme. Some of the solutions may be the same, if a person has 
debt problems then these need to be sorted out, however, local VSOs often 
have an emphasis on linking the person back into their communities, an 
approach that depends on highly localised knowledge and networks. The 
models of change are conceptually and practically different. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
We characterise what has been developing in Manchester as a form of city-
regional localism in which civic (elite) entrepreneurs have been able to develop 
their own forms of local solutions in the generally permissive policy environment 
of Localism. The most recent announcement of the intention to create a Mayor 
of Greater Manchester and to devolve a raft of powers to the city-region further 
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reinforces the trend toward city-regional localism and demonstrates, we believe, 
the potential for further divergence in real social policies between metropolitan 
areas. This will, in effect, be the proof of the localist pudding. GM hopes it will 
be the platform for extending and developing the GM Public Services Reform 
Model, particularly as the decentralisation of health and welfare spending will 
depend on a business case underpinned by the various technocratic models 
described above. 
 
However, as the example of the Troubled Families programme – crucially, a 
nationally developed and funded package which has been tweaked and 
redesigned through the very specific policy-making apparatus at the GM level – 
shows, there are real dilemmas and barriers facing the voluntary and 
community sector. This matters because the voluntary sector is both being 
recruited as part of the reform efforts, and at the same time its functions and 
existing contributions to social welfare are being taken for granted by the public 
sector, chief among them AGMA, MCC, New Economy, and its close partners. 
To date Troubled Families is perhaps the most significant experiment in public 
sector reform attempted at a city-regional level, and demonstrates many of the 
difficulties facing the local voluntary sector. It is a flagship programme intended 
to demonstrate the potential for increased efficiency of statutory services, likely 
to be at the core of GM’s argument to devolve further powers over health and 
welfare spending.  
 
Yet VSOs in Manchester had little involvement in the planning, in general do not 
understand the model, feel alienated by the technocratic language and only 
have a peripheral role in its delivery. Rather than supporting the work of local 
VSOs, building on what they do, and valuing the evidence they produce, the 
Troubled Families Programme is a centrally planned, problem-based, key-
worker model. Like the rest of the PSR, it is underpinned by mechanistic logics 
of cost-benefit analysis and specific forms of research-quality evidence. In its 
technocratic and abstracted policy formulation, VSOs and the community are 
considered part of an external environment and, arguably, part of the problem 
rather than the solution. 
 
CVSs traditionally act as the mediators between the state and VSOs and there 
has been some involvement both at GM and Manchester levels, however, even 
the CVSs found the model and language difficult to understand and could not 
see how to involve VSOs in an approach where the pattern of services was pre-
determined and did not include existing working services (except where they 
could provide evidence of their effectiveness at a level which very few or no 
local organisations could provide). The scale, rapidity, complexity and the model 
of change mean that CVSs struggle to involve VSOs or even keep them 
informed.  
 
Large VSOs may benefit from the PSR programme as they are able to operate 
at larger scale, have the capacity to collect and wield evidence, and to bid for 
contracts, as long as they are willing to adopt the approach of PSR. To some 
extent a city-regional localism may help them to simplify and streamline their 
relationships with civic governance. They will only have to maintain 
relationships with officers and politicians working at a GM level rather than with 
officers and politicians in every borough. 
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However, it is difficult to see how any of these benefits might accrue to small 
and medium-sized VSOs working in health and social services, the very 
organisations that have traditionally played the greatest role in local service 
delivery. They do not operate at a GM level and to do so might well destroy 
much of their value. Often they have strong and well-formed ideas about the 
needs of specific communities that conflict with the laissez-faire approach of the 
hyper-local policies exemplified by the Localism Act and also clash with city 
regional localism, exemplified in this article by the evidence-based, targeted 
approach of the GM PSR programme. They are contradictorily portrayed as old-
fashioned and insufficiently innovative while at the same time extolled as a vital 
part of the civic infrastructure that will fill the gaps left by retreating public 
services. CVSs similarly are caught between these different forms of localism in 
playing their mediation role, struggling to explain the relevance or local impact 
of PSR to smaller VSOs, or its rationale and how they might fit in to larger ones. 
 
Devolution of powers and finance to GM has been lauded as a part of the 
solution to the fiscal and social problems besetting the city-region, and it has 
allowed the Coalition to position itself as serious about localism and devolution. 
In GM, the clear signs are that what has been developing is an elite, 
technocratic, and insufficiently democratic version of city regional localism, as 
opposed to the Big Society-esque vision of creative, locally-developed, 
autonomous solutions situated in harmonious arrangements of civil society, 
slimmed down state, and private sector that was envisioned in the policy 
formulation of Localism. Our experience and previous research suggests that 
other cities follow and lag developments in Manchester, albeit within their own 
specific local political configurations, political-cultural traditions, and local 
government-civil society relationships. We suggest therefore that policy-makers, 
practitioners and scholars in spatial governance, social policy, and voluntary 
sector studies, need to take seriously the implications of different forms of 
Localism, and carry out grounded research into its manifestations. 
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Figure 1: Taken from the Greater Manchester Troubled Families Model, Source: 
http://www.manchester.gov.uk/manchesterpartnership/downloads/file/228/troubled_f
amilies_programme_presentation, accessed 9.11.14 
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